Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 5

1954

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-METHOD
OF REVIEW WHERE A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT IS LEVIED ON A
RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY
Judson M. Werbelow S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and
the Transportation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Judson M. Werbelow S.Ed., MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-METHOD OF REVIEW
WHERE A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT IS LEVIED ON A RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY, 52 MICH. L. REV. 759 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss5/15

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1954]

RECENT DECISIONS

759

MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATioNs-SPECIAL AssEsSMENTs-MErnon OF R.Evmw
WHERE A SPECIAL AssESSMENT Is LEVIED ON A RAn.noAD llicHT-oF-WAYDefendant municipality made surface and curb improvements on a street located
near plaintiff railroad's right-of-way. Four parcels of land, each containing a
house, separated the right-of-way from the street on which the improvements
were made. Plaintiff's right-of-way contained a single set of railroad tracks over
which plaintiff's trains traveled. Property owners in the improvement district
were assessed a total of $13,220.90 for the improvements, $4,715.53 of this
special assessment being levied on plaintiff's right-of-way. Plaintiff brought suit
to enjoin collection of that part of the special assessment which was levied on
its property. The trial court found that the improvement did not benefit the
plaintiff's right-of-way and granted the injunction. On appeal, held, affirmed.
After reviewing the evidence, it was found that the right-of-way was not benefited by the street improvements, and therefore the special assessment on the
plaintiff's property was void. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Omaha, 156 Neb.
705, 57 N.W. (2d) 753 (1953).
The theory of special assessments is that property peculiarly benefited by
municipal improvements should bear the cost of the improvement to the extent
that it is specially benefited.1 Various tests have been used to determine whether
or not property has been benefited by a municipal improvement. Generally the
courts look to the difference in the value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the improvement.2 However, within this general rule there is
a split of authority as to whether future benefits and adaptability of the property
to more profitable uses are to be taken into consideration3 or whether the ques-

lNorwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 19 S.Ct. 187 (1898); 14 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §38.01 (1950)
2 G. T. Fogle & Co. v. King, 132 W.Va. 224, 51 S.E. (2d) 776 (1948); Board of
Education of School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Alexander v. Village of Alexander, 92 N.Y.S.
(2d) 471 (1949).
s Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Omaha, 154 Neb. 442, 48 N.W. (2d) 409 (1951);
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. Ry. Co. v. City of Minot, 51 N.D. 313, 199 N.W. 875
(1924); Howard Park Co. v. Los Angeles, (Cal. 1953) 259 P. (2d) 977; Appeal of Public
Service Elec. & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super. 357, 87 A. (2d) 344 (1952); Gingles v. City of
Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 41 N.W. (2d) 717 (1950); Phil., B. & W. R.R. v. Hazen, 73 App.
D.C. 37, 116 F. (2d) 543 (1940).
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tion of benefits is limited to a consideration of the land in its present use.4 One
court has taken the point of view that generally future benefits are taken into
consideration, but where the property is restricted by law to its present use the
benefit must inure to the restricted use. 5 In the principal case, it was doubtful
that the plaintiff's right-of-way would benefit from the street improvement,
regardless of whether or not future benefits were considered. The improvement
would not benefit the property in its present use and the interest of the plaintiff
in the property was one that would revert to the grantor if used for other than
railroad purposes. Nevertheless, the City of Omaha, acting under legislative
authority, had seen fit to levy a special assessment on plaintiff's right-of-way.
How is a court to treat such an assessment, which implies a finding that the
right-of-way will benefit from the street improvement? Again there is a lack of
uniformity in the courts. A number of courts hold that the question of special
benefits is a legislative question and view the finding of the duly authorized
assessing body as conclusive unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable or fraudulent. 6
This approach has been held to be constitutional when attacked on due process
grounds. 7 What appears to be a minority of the courts approach the question of
special benefits as a judicial question and make findings of fact as to whether
or not the property has received a special benefit.8 It is suggested that the
minority approach reflects a greater sensitivity to the theory of special assessments and due process provisions.9 A factor in the decisions seems to be the
degree of objectivity which the legislature provides in its method of assessment. 10
Thus the legislature may increase the conclusiveness of its determination by
specifying as objective a standard as possible for use in levying the assessment.
A distinguishing feature in the cases seems to be that those courts which include
future benefits when evaluating the property after the improvement tend to

4Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 278 lli. 86, 115 N.E. 836 (1917); Appeal of
Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 8 N.J. Super. 376, 72 A. (2d) 426 (1950).
5 Hinsdale Sanitary Dist. v. Hinsdale Golf Club, 363 lli. 595, 2 N.E. (2d) 921 (1936).
6 Struble v. Cincinnati, 83 Ohio App. 304, 82 N.E. (2d) 127 (1948); Atlantic
Coastline Ry. Co. v. Winterhaven, 112 Fla. 807, 151 S. 321 (1933); Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Co. v. Riverton, Freemont County, (Wyo. 1952) 246 P. (2d) 789, reh. (Wyo. 1952) 247
P. (2d) 660; Grand Rapids v. Grand Trunk Ry., 214 Mich. 1, 182 N.W. 424 (1921);
Sterling Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Charleston Transit Co., 126 W.Va. 42, 27 S.E.
(2d) 256 (1943); Seattle v. Seattle & Montana Ry. Co., 50 Wash. 132, 96 P. 958 (1908);
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Improvement Dist., 266 U.S. 379, 45 S.Ct. 136 (1924).
1 Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 25 S.Ct.
466 (1905); Branson v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182, 40 S.Ct. 113 (1919).
s Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., note 4 supra; Maryland & Pennsylvania Ry.
Co. v. Nice, 185 Md. 429, 45 A. (2d) 109 (1945); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Omaha,
156 Neb. 705, 57 N.W. (2d) 753 (1953); City of Barre v. Barre & Chelsea R. Co., 97
Vt. 398, 123 A. 427 (1924); Naugatuck Ry. Co. v. Waterbury, 78 Conn. 193, 61 A. 474
(1905); Appeal of Public Service Blee. & Gas. Co., note 4 supra.
9 In the principal case, the state constitution contained a due process clause, Neb.
Const., art. I, §3, which had to be considered in addition to that contained in U.S. CoNST.,
amend. XIV, §1.
10 Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Riverton, Freemont County, note 6 supra.
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treat the question of special benefits as legislative.11 On the other hand, those
courts which require the benefit to be conferred on the present use of the property tend to treat the question of special benefits as judicial.12 This distinction
appears to be sound, for the legislature is as well equipped as any other governmental body to determine the question of future benefits, whereas the courts are
probably in the best position to consider whether or not special benefits are being
presently conferred. Although the decisions present many divisions of authority,
it seems likely that if the problem arises in a case of first impression or in a case
involving new or altered assessment legislation, the various factors which have
been discussed here will be taken into consideration by the court.13

Judson M. Werbelow, S.Ed.

11 Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., note 7 supra; Howard
Park Co. v. Los Angeles, note 3 supra; Phil. B. & W. R.R. v. Hazen, note 3 supra.
12 Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., note 4 supra; Appeal of Public Service Elec.
& Gas. Co., note 4 supra.
13 See generally 12 MINN. L. REv. 524 (1928). For collection of cases see 37 A.L.R.
219 (1925); 82 A.L.R. 425 (1933).

